Implications of the Recent Financial Crisis for Innovation

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1. Introduction

Discussion of the recent financial crisis has centered on the excesses of finance, the increases in debt and leverage that preceded the crisis, and causes and consequences of that “Ponzi” finance. But while these excesses of finance are important, and discussion of them illuminating,\(^2\) this paper on the crisis has a different focus. It is concerned not with finance itself, its operations or regulation, but with its effects on the “real economy”, on the productive capabilities of firms and the innovation that develops them. We consider the implications the crisis has for this innovation, asking what is its likely impact on the future innovation of firms.

The effect of the crisis on innovation depends on its financial requirements, and we examine these in the first part of our discussion. We consider the function of finance along with the kind of finance innovation needs, and argue that its equity financing is more feasible than its debt financing. Equity finance is more suited to the uncertainties of innovation, and intangibility of research and development investments, and this gives the stock market a special importance in the innovation undertaken by new firms – those too young to have capital of their own.

We discuss the effects of the stock market in the second part of the paper, which centers on the relation between stock prices and R&D investment. We examine Tobin’s (and Minsky’s) “q” theory and the implications it has for this investment, along with the relationship between innovation and stock prices in the 1920s and 1990s. We compare the links between them in these periods with those of the 2000s, arguing that what

\(^2\)See, in particular, Cassidy (2009) and Davidson (2009).
distinguishes the recent run up in asset prices from the bubbles of those other eras is that this bubble was not accompanied by an investment boom, in either fixed capital or R&D. Finance financed finance, increasing its availability instead of productive capabilities, with the innovations of the period mainly financial, and the legacy not new production facilities and knowledge that could be utilized under more propitious conditions, but unfinished housing developments and abandoned houses.

What finance finances matters, and, in important respects, matters more than its excesses. For it is when, and only when, finance finances real investments that there are new technologies and products to develop and commercialize, and it is because it did not in the 2000s that the outlook for innovation today is bleak.

2. Financial Requirements for Innovation

2.1 Finance

If we take finance in its dictionary meaning, as “the money at the disposal of an organization, country, or person” (Encarta Dictionary) or, in its verb form, “to raise or provide the money required for something…”, then finance is needed when the revenues and expenditures of a business are out of sync, temporally or quantitatively. If expenditures had to be incurred before revenues were realized, money would have to be on hand to meet them, and this would be the case also if the requisite expenditures exceeded the incoming revenues. Finance, as Keynes (1938) suggests, bridges the gap between revenues and expenditures.

In so far as production is time consuming, and both its inputs and outputs are commodities, most, if not all, production processes would require finance. The only
ones that would not require it would be those whose products were ordered and paid for before they were produced. But in this case those who bought the products would, in effect, be financing their production.

Production can be financed in one of three ways: (1) out of sales revenues, (2) through bank loans or other borrowings and (3) through equity issues or other asset sales. The first is the way production is financed in Schumpeter’s “circular flow,” and is possible only under its equilibrium conditions. In it, the same products are produced and consumed in the same amounts year after year. All the products have sales – none are new or produced anew – and revenue from sales that covers costs. Production generates the revenue it requires, and this revenue can finance it even though its processes take time, and products sold after they are produced. For as long as production continues at the same rate as in the past, and its transactions effected at regular and known intervals, it can be financed with the proceeds from past sales, with firms holding these funds in bank balances for the purposes of their upcoming transactions. There would be a transactions demand for money, but no “finance demand” – need for bank loans or bond and equity issues.

For both Keynes and Schumpeter, debt-finance is needed for growth, to break out of the “circular flow.” Expansion, Keynes argues\(^3\), cannot be financed out of sales revenues – it requires more funds than are “released” through current expenditure, which funds, of course, are exactly equal to the present levels of spending on investment and consumption. Thus, for either investment or consumption to increase without an equivalent cut in the other, additional funds are required, and since the

\(^3\) See Keynes’s post-General Theory writings on finance and saving (Keynes, 1937a, 1937b, and 1938).
money needed for investment has to be raised before it is undertaken, the savings that the investment generates cannot provide that finance. These savings are realized “concurrently” with the investment, as it increases the income out of which savings are made, so that while they can fund the investment after the investment is made, they cannot do so before hand. That “prior” finance can only be provided through the extension of credit or “dishoarding of the public”, with the demand for it an important, and distinct, component of the overall demand for money (what Davidson (1972) calls the “finance motive” for holding money).

Schumpeter’s view of finance and the credit system is similar to Keynes’s, and, in important respects, is the same. Debt finance is needed for innovation, and it is needed for the same reason that expansion requires the extension of credit in Keynes: because the revenues of firms cannot provide the requisite finance. Innovation requires investment in new production facilities, those needed for the production of the new product or the improvement of production processes. Entrepreneurs cannot carry out these “new factor combinations” without this investment, through just a reorganization of production. And while that investment is profitable, it cannot be financed out of its profits. Profit is not realized until the investment is completed, and new production processes are in operation, and, as Keynes emphasizes, the money for such investment has to be provided before.

New products have no sales until they are commercialized and, even then, sales may not be high enough, or cost low enough, for a profit. Their production cannot be financed out of their own revenues, and when their introduction requires new firms, as is assumed in Schumpeter (1939), it cannot be financed out of the revenue from other
products either. That “internal financing” is possible only when established firms introduce these innovations, and even in this case, as Schumpeter (1939) notes, external finance may be required as those firms might not have sufficient profits for new product investments. Their revenues might be wholly taken up with the financing of existing operations, as would be the case for smaller firms and especially those operating in competitive markets (Eichner, 1976).

2.2 New Ventures

Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs finance their innovations through bank loans. Banks extend the requisite credit, and, in so doing, provide the funds needed for the expansion of the economy. Yet, innovation is risky, too risky for debt financing; both the profit from it and time of its realization are uncertain. Neither have the certainty assumed in Schumpeter (1939), and in the absence of that predictability, the debt financing of innovation would be possible only under special conditions, such as the relational banking of the Japanese “main bank” system or “universal banking” of the German one in Schumpeter’s times.

While all investment is risky -- its profit is a “prospective” one (Keynes, 1936) -- investments in established products and technologies have at least a track record. They have been undertaken in the past, and undertaken profitably. Recessions and other unknowable developments can disappoint the expectations which prompted them, but, still, they have a history to draw on in the estimation of their “prospective yields.” The profit from an investment in an auto assembly plant will likely be no more or less than the profit made from such investment in the past. It is determinable within limits, as is
the time of its realization, for the time needed to bring the new plant on line is likely to be the same as that needed for other plants constructed under similar conditions.

The profit from an innovation is not so determinable, and in the case of revolutionary innovations (such as the personal computer), it is not determinable at all. Innovations, by definition, are new: untried and undeveloped products and technologies, with yet to be determined applications and uses. The profit from innovations cannot be known, and is not known, until they are developed and their markets established, and the time needed for this is not predictable either. Not only does it take a long time for innovations to be developed and commercialized⁴, it also takes an indeterminable amount of time, so that even if the innovation proves profitable, it may not turn a profit within the term limits of the loan that financed it.

The “moral hazard” problems of lenders would be especially great in the case of an innovation loan. Lenders would have to rely on the borrower’s knowledge of the investment and projections of its profits, for there is little else to base these projections on, while the borrower will have not only a greater knowledge of the innovation than the lender, but also a greater confidence in it. He is, after all, its “inventor”, and his personal involvement in it will be reflected in its profit forecasts.⁵

These “moral hazard” problems can, of course, be reduced through collateral, but R&D investments cannot be given in collateral. These investments have no “scrap value”; the money spent on the development of a new product or technology is not

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⁴ In the case of biopharmaceuticals, drug development can take from 10 to 20 years (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011).
⁵ Information disclosure problems may also impede the debt financing of innovation. Firms, as Hall (2005) argues, may be reluctant to disclose information on innovations to lenders in the fear that this knowledge will be communicated to competitors.
recoverable, in whole or in part, unless the innovation proves successful. Knowledge is intangible and new knowledge valuable only when it produces a marketable product or patentable process, and while loans can be collateralized with assets other than those financed, “start-ups” have no other collateral to offer. They cannot provide this collateral for the same reason they cannot finance innovations out of the profit from past investments: they have not yet made any.

Equity finance is the only alternative to government finance in the case of a new venture, and though equity investors assume more risk than creditors, their returns can be much higher. Equity investments participate in the profit of the enterprise, in both the profit from its innovation and profit from its public incorporation (IPO). The profit from its IPO can be realized even if the innovation fails, and in many cases has (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011), while its prospect can attract the requisite investment. Investors can finance the innovation in the hope of realizing those capital gains.

Venture capital is an especially propitious form of innovation financing. It provides the startup capital that the friends and relatives of entrepreneurs provided in past eras, institutionalizing the provisioning of this capital in firms established for its purposes and competing on the basis of their investment returns. Because these venture capital firms are on-going enterprises, with specialized management and market reputations, they can mobilize the capital of many investors as well as leverage

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6 This is not to say that these financing options are mutually exclusive. Indeed, in many cases innovations have to be subsidized, through government grants or contracts, for their risks to be reduced enough for private financing (Lazonick and Tulum, 2011).
their operations, significantly extending the financing available to new innovative enterprises, while freeing their finances from the vagaries of individual fortunes.⁷

Equity investments not only provide the incentives needed for the financing of innovation, they are also more suited to its uncertainties than bank credit. They are open-ended and unconditional, with no term limits. The capital invested in the enterprise stays in it; it cannot be “called in,” as loan capital can, or withdrawn when revenues fall below a certain level. Venture capital can be “impatient” and investment in the innovation ended before it’s developed, but the money invested does not have to be paid back. There is no specific date at which the equity finance expires, just as there is no date for any payment on the equity; its return is as indefinite as that on the innovation itself.

To summarize, then, innovation has special financing requirements. It requires 1) outside financing in that an innovation, by definition, cannot be self financed, and 2) equity financing in that the risks of innovations are too great, and the capital invested too specialized, for debt financing. This equity financing can, in turn, be provided in one of two ways: a) through investments in the innovation by the firm that undertakes it (“internal equity”) or b) through investments in it by venture capital firms or other outside investors (“external equity”). The first (a) is possible only in the case of established firms with sufficient profit for new endeavors, while the second (b) requires the stock markets and investment firms of modern finance.

⁷ Venture capital firms have the same innovation financing advantages that the large pharmaceutical companies have. The scale of their R&D investment (each fund finances a number of innovations) reduces its risks, while the successes assure investors. For the importance of venture capital in the development of “Silicon Valley” see Lazonick (2007).
3. Stock Prices and Innovation

3.1 Bubbles

The dependence of innovation on equity financing makes it dependent on the operations of stock markets and the firms that trade on them. These venture capitals, investment banks, and other investment firms invest for the purposes of capital gain. They finance new ventures not for the profit from their operation, but for the profit from their public incorporation and other stock offerings, and these capital gains are more likely in times of rising stock prices.

Booming stock markets increase the funds for new ventures, as the profits from their incorporation (and secondary stock offerings) rise with the rise in stock prices. These capital gain prospects draw in new investors, as does the ease of selling shares. The liquidity of these markets reduces the risks of investing in new ventures, while the rise in the share prices of the incorporated ones promotes investment in others.

But while a rising stock market increases the funds for new ventures, it also proliferates their numbers, increasing the competition in the industries and markets they are developing (O’Sullivan, 2007). New firms will be “spun off” from already operating ones, as the employees of successful firms start their own with the money from the sale of their shares or exercise of their stock options (Lazonick, 2007), while other firms will be started up with the capital gains from the rise in share prices. And when that stock market boom is itself driven by the innovations of new enterprises, with the profit opportunities of their new technologies driving up stock prices, this new venture investment will likely reach unprofitable levels. There will not only be “fraudulent”
investments floated on the stock exchange, but also excessive investment in the new technology and the markets or industries affected by it (as occurred in the “dot.com” bubble, discussed below). The “bubble” will inflate the investment in the products of the technology as well as the prices of the enterprises which develop them, ending in not only a stock market crash, but in an investment collapse.

The uncertainties of new technologies lend themselves to the unmitigated optimism of financial market bubbles, and indeed, it is precisely because their profits are indeterminate that they can hold out the prospect of unlimited profit. It is not surprising, then, that so many of these bubbles have been associated with technological developments, or that major innovations have generated the financing that they required (Perez, 2009). But while the profit prospects of innovations might secure their capital market financing, that dependence on financial markets subjects them to the speculative excesses of these markets and the boom and bust cycles that accompany them.

The operations of stock markets affect the innovation of established firms as well as that of new enterprises. While firms profitable enough for innovation have little need for the funds of capital markets, they can profit from investment in these markets, from speculation in other firms’ shares and/or from speculation in the companies themselves. The profitability of that financial investment increases with the rise in stock prices\(^8\), so that these increases in stock prices can divert funds from investments in product

\(^8\) Mergers and acquisitions boom in times of rising stock prices (Medlen, 2003), contributing to those price rises as well as being driven by them.
development and production processes, turning firms into stock traders, with the same interest in short term profits and capital gains that financial firms have.

This is not to say that mergers and acquisitions are made for speculative purposes only. They can be undertaken for strategic reasons, to increase the competitiveness of the enterprise in its existing markets, or for the long-term profit from expansion into new ones. Firms may have to acquire the technology of other companies to develop their own technologies, and given the pace of innovation in high-tech industries, acquisitions may be the only way to maintain or increase market share.

Yet, bull markets provide lucrative alternatives to the investments of production. Speculation can dominate over enterprise in industry also, and whether it does depends not only on the financial pressures of firms, but also on norms and incentives. If the market value of companies matters more than their productive capabilities, if it is the measure of their performance and decides the pay of executives, the energies of firms will be directed towards increases in share prices. Short-term earnings will be decisive, with the quick gains of financial investments chosen over the more uncertain, long-term profits from investments in products and production processes. Bull markets will, in this case, deplete investment funds rather than increase them, and the relation between stock prices and investment will be the exact opposite of the one assumed in the “q” theory of Tobin and other economists.

3.2 “q” theory

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9 This investment effect of a rise in stock prices is modeled in Bhaduri (2011).
10 Cisco provides an interesting example of this acquisition growth strategy (Carpenter, Lazonick, and O’Sullivan, 2003).
The effects of stock prices on the innovation and investment of firms depends then on their objectives, and especially on the extent to which enterprise (in Keynes's sense) dominates over speculation in their investment. If enterprise dominates, firms would acquire capital assets for the profit from their operation, not the capital gain from their sale, with the "quasi-rents" from them more important than the differences between their sale and purchase prices. Firms would decide investments on the basis of their prospective yields rather than expected price changes, and insofar as stock prices affect these profit estimates, a rise in stock prices could increase investment, as it does in Tobin's and Minsky's "q" theory of investment.

In Tobin's q theory, stock markets value the assets of firms, assessing their profitability, and firms decide investments on the basis of their market valuations. If the market value of a firm's assets, as reflected in the price of its stock and bonds, rises above the replacement cost of the assets -- that is, if their "q" ratio becomes greater than 1 -- the firm will increase its investment in them, and increases in stock prices will raise investment as long as these prices rise faster than the prices (or production costs) of capital goods (Tobin and Brainard, 1977).

A heightened market valuation of a firm is a heightened valuation of its assets, an increase in the present (discounted) value of their projected future earnings. While the earnings from the productive assets of a business are not the same as the earnings from a share of stock- the earnings from these assets are the "net cash flows over their lifetimes," whereas those from a share "include all future dividends and other distributions" - the securities of a corporation are "essentially claims to the earnings thrown off by the real productive assets of the business" (ibid., p. 238). The value of
these securities will thus rise with increases in the market assessment of those assets, “when the market revises upward its expectations of (their) future earnings, or revises downward its discount rates,” and the market value of a firm’s assets will be reflected, however imperfectly, in the price of its stock.

As stock prices reflect the market value of existing capital assets, they affect the investment in new ones, and affect that investment for the same reason that the resale prices of other reproducible assets (such as houses) affect their production. Just as a rise in the prices of existing homes relative to current building costs encourages residential construction, a rise in stock prices relative to current costs of capital assets encourages capital investment. The “incentive” for the investment, in both cases, “is the gain to be made by the excess of market price over replacement cost” (ibid, p. 236), with the only difference between the cases being that stock prices express the market value of existing capital assets, while the prices of already constructed houses is their market value.

Securities markets are not markets for used (or new) capital goods, but, according to Tobin and Brainard (1977), they provide more timely and pertinent information about the productive assets of enterprises than the second hand markets for those assets (ibid, 237). Stock markets are “well organized and efficient,” with highly sensitive and flexible prices. Their prices fluctuate more than the costs of the assets they “indirectly” value, but they are decided on the basis of the expected earnings of these assets, not on how others are expected to value them or the enterprises that own them. Enterprise dominates over speculation in stock investments, and firms “maximize shareholder value” through profitable investments, as these increase their future
earnings and thus appreciate their shares to the benefit of their share holders (ibid, p.242).

Tobin saw his q theory as a development of Keynes' conception of investment and the importance of stock prices in its determination. Keynes, as Tobin notes, emphasized the effects of these prices on the expectations that decided investment, but his view of their influence was quite different than Tobin's. A booming stock market stimulated investment, but it encouraged foolish investments as well as sound ones, as there was "an inducement to spend on a new project what may seem an extravagant sum, if it can be floated off on the Stock Exchange at an immediate profit" (ibid., p. 151). Stock markets were not the efficient markets of Tobin's theory - speculation drove their prices - so that whereas Tobin thought that stock prices not only did, but should, decide investment, Keynes hoped that they would not.  

Minsky (1975 and 1986) shared Tobin's view on the positive relation between stock prices and investment, though his treatment of investment was closer to Keynes' own. For him, as for Tobin, the capital assets of firms were valued in the markets for their securities, for "in a corporate capitalist economy with a stock exchange, the market's valuation of a firm's capital assets and market position substitutes for the price of capital assets" (Minsky, 1986a, p. 186). The price of these assets affected the demand for new investments of a similar kind - their "demand price" - as the expectations of firms (and their bankers) were "adaptive" (ibid, p.205). They expected the profit from new investments to be the same as that earned on existing investments,

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11 The "duty," he says, "of ordering the current volume of investment cannot safely be left in private hands" (Keynes, 1936, p. 320).
so that if the value of these investments changed, as it would over the “course of the stock market,” so would their demand price. The expected returns on new investments rose and fell with the movements in stock prices.

As the expected profit from investment depended on the level of stock prices, so did the pace of investment. If the market value of the “capital assets collected in a firm” is “high relative to the supply price of such assets newly produced, … the pace of investment in such assets will be stepped up” (Minsky, 1975, p. 101). Rises in stock prices increased investment, as they did in Tobin’s q theory, but the result of these rises was not the Walrasian equilibrium of Tobin’s theory. Increases in investment raised aggregate demand and thus the profit from existing investments, heightening the profit expectations of firms and market valuations of their assets. A rise in stock prices led to a rise in investment and a rise in investment to an increase in profits and stock prices, and the excessive investment of the boom, along with the accompanying rise in interest rates, eroded the finances of firms, ending in a collapse of investment.

While the finances of firms worsened as the boom proceeded, and more and more of them became dependent on credit and/or asset sales for debt payments, their objectives remained the same. Firms were not drawn into financial investments by the speculative gains of the bull market. They, instead, continued to invest for “yield” - for the earnings from capital assets, the “quasi-rents” expected from their “use in production” (Minsky, 1986, p. 200) rather than the capital gains expected from their sale. Investment finance became “speculative” in the course of the boom, as the
“hedge” financing of investment gave way to its speculative financing, but investment itself did not.\footnote{In Minsky (1986), hedge and speculative finance are different types of investment financing, distinguished by the relation between the expected cash flows from existing investments and committed cash payments on the finance for the new investment. If the expected cash flows cover fully all payment commitments, both short term and long, then the investment is “hedge” financed, whereas if they can repay the debt in the long run, but can only cover the interest payments on it in the short run, then the financing of the investment would be “speculative.”}

Q theory has been criticized for its lack of unambiguous empirical support, for its “Wall Street” view of the firm and neglect of the role of management.\footnote{Crotty (1990) criticizes q theory for its conflation of enterprise ownership and management; Gordon and Veitch (1986) find no empirical support for its “Wall Street view” of the relation between stock prices and investment, while Gilchrist et al. (2002) find some support for it, and Schoder (2011) reviews the recent literature and provides his own estimates using US firm-level data on fixed investment for 1971-2007. He also fails to find the “q” variable to be statistically significant in his GMM regression, although he does find some support for a bond-based (as opposed to stock market based) “q”.

Yet, in spite of its limitations, q theory does highlight a critical feature of capitalist economies: the dependence of their performance on the operations of stock markets. Innovation, as we have argued, relies heavily on equity financing, on venture capital and the possibility of enterprise incorporations (IPOs) in the case of new ventures, and on the reinvestment of profits in that of the innovations of established firms. The managers of these enterprises may know more about their operations and investment opportunities than investors, but they still can be affected by movements in stock prices, and whether they are affected in the way assumed in q theory depends not only on the objectives of investors but also on their own.

In a brief overview of the U.S. experience in the next section, we find a correlation between stock price movements and innovative effort in the 1920’s and 1990’s, but not in the 2000s. In these earlier decades, increases in R&D and new product introductions were accompanied by a rise in stock prices, as the prospect of...
high returns on the new product and process investments increased the market valuations of the innovating enterprises, while the rise in the price of their stocks led to stock speculation (especially in the 1990s) and increased investment in new technology enterprises. While, here, the relation between stock prices and innovation was not the unidirectional one of the q theory - innovation affected stock prices as much as they affected innovation - innovation did occur along with the rise in stock prices, so that the experiences of these decades is not inconsistent with the Tobin/Minsky view.

The experience of the 2000s was quite different - the "q" correlation between innovative effort and stock prices, so prominent in the 1920s and 1990s, was not present. Instead of being accompanied by a surge of innovative effort, the stock price bubble of the 2000s was accompanied by a wave of “financialization”, in which the financial sector grew as a share of GDP and its share of corporate profits spiked. This financialization, as we argue below, affected the operations of non-financial firms; these became more like financial concerns, maximizing share holder value not through profitable investments in products and production processes (as Tobin’s firms did), but through financial investments and stock buy backs. Speculation dominated over enterprise in their investment also, and it was because it did that the “q” relation between innovation and stock prices was no longer operative.

4. Financial Bubbles and Innovation: Some Historical Comparisons

A number of studies show the extensive industrial innovation in the 1920s and its connection to the stock market boom of that decade. While innovation in the 1990s was largely in the emerging IT sector, the role of new equity issues was clear. In the 2000s
innovation occurred mainly in the financial sector itself, with the explosive creation of new derivatives (in particular CDOs) and an apparent hedge in the form of credit default swaps. These financial innovations increased the profits of the financial sector, and financial stock prices increased with these increases in profits, but there is little evidence of a “q” relation between stock prices and innovation in other sectors of the economy.

4.1 The 1920s: Technical Change and Roaring Equities

According to Field (2003), the 1930s was a particularly strong decade of innovation. This was not the result of the financial crash that occurred in 1929, but because of the unusual combination of science and technology from the preceding decades that, combined with research and development in the 1930, gave off a wave of productivity-enhancing innovations in sectors including chemicals, railroads, electrical machinery and aviation. Field focuses on the productivity growth of the depression years, but what seems crucial is its dependence on the innovation/investment of the previous decade – the 1920s.

There is broad agreement on the growth in industrial production in the 1920s. Gordon and Veitch (1986) portray investment in relation to potential GDP, and show investment in relation to that natural GDP, and especially non-residential investment, to be especially high in the 1920s (Gordon and Veitch, 1986, Figure 5.1). Galbraith writes in *The Great Crash* that “The twenties in America were a very good time,” noting that “The Federal Reserve index of industrial production which had averaged only 67 in
1921 (1923-25=100) had risen to 110 by July 1928, and it reached 126 in June 1929.” (Galbraith, 1962, p. 8).14

Figure 1 shows patent activity (patents granted) and the Dow Jones Industrial average for the period 1910-1940. We see a clear correlation in the movement of stock prices and patents, although it is impossible from this to determine if there is any causal relation – increased patenting seems to lead stock price movements in the period from 1910-1925 and then stock price movements from 1925-1940 appear to occur ahead of changes in the rate of patenting.

14 See also Isenberg (1989).
A number of case studies have emphasized the strength of innovative effort by firms in the 1920s, as well as its relation to the surge in stock prices. Devine (1983) focuses on electrification in that decade, but shows that productivity growth in manufacturing generally was quite high (see Devine, 1983, Table 2 on p. 350) -- not quite as high as the ‘30s, but a significant increase over the 1910s - indeed, in percentage terms - a greater increase than that of the 1930s over the 1920s. Gordon and Veitch (1986) also point to electrification during the 1920s as an important boon to economic growth, but highlight other innovations also, viewing the expansion of the 1920s as an outgrowth of a “Schumpeterian bunching of investments” in electrification, radio, telephone, chemicals and the great expansion in the use of motor vehicles.

O'Sullivan (2007) emphasizes the role of the stock market in the financing of new firms in the new aviation and radio industries of the 1920s, while Nicholas (2007) highlights the effects of the industrial innovation on stock prices. He ties the stock market boom of the 1920s to the investment in “intangible capital” – measured, in his article, by the patents obtained in that decade. He presents evidence on the relation between patents of particular firms (AT&T, G.E., Western Electric, etc.) and the market value of their stocks, as well as on the relation between the growth of their patents in the 1920s and Tobin’s “q” (pp. 230-232), and finds that “intangible capital growth was substantial in 1920s America…,” that “investors realized it” and “integrated this information into their market pricing decisions” (p.218).
4.2 The 1990s: Dot-Com Boom and Bust

The apparently strong connection between stock prices and investment/innovations identified in the 1920s was also evident in the 1990's. The 1990s expansion incorporated the investment boom of a Minskyan cycle, with a 9.425% average annual growth rate in non-residential private fixed investment over the years of that expansion (1992-1999).

Figure 2 shows the relation between (non-residential) investment spending as a share of GDP and stock prices over the period 1991-2010. We can see that the two variables begin to move up in tandem in the early 1990s and move together for most of the decade. After the 2001 recession, however, the deviation between the two grows and they even move in opposite directions. Figure 3 shows the same stock price index, graphed with R&D spending, and the 1990s shows a direct correlation between these two variables also.\(^{15}\) Although no causal relation can be determined from these graphs, Figures 2 and 3 do show a clear positive correlation between stock prices, fixed investment, and innovative effort as captured by R&D spending.

\(^{15}\) See also Brown et al. (2009), which finds statistically significant correlations between equity finance (cash flow and equity issues) and R&D spending for young firms in their study of the 1990s US IT boom.
Figure 2: Stock Prices and Investment as a % of GDP, 1985-2011*

* Source: BEA; NBER; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Recession years are indicated in gray. Investment is private, non-residential fixed investment. Stock Prices are the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
The 1990s had not only the investment boom of a Minskyan business cycle, but also the financial innovation. Investment banks “talked up” the boom in internet stocks, marketing their IPOs on the basis of a “new” financial valuation – that of “mind share” and “market share” (the former measured by the number of “web site” hits) instead of the traditional valuations on the basis of net income or revenue growth (Cassidy, 2002). This ensured the provision of finance for the new internet enterprises, and while that new financial valuation was not a new financial (or credit) instrument, it was an innovation in risk assessment, and the banks played the same role in the 1990s business cycle as they did in Minsky’s: they fueled the expansion through financial innovations that increased the financial fragility of firms (in this case leading to the
financing of many “failed” dot.com enterprises, as well as some older technology ones like Lucent, which got caught up in the excessive investment in the infrastructure of the “web revolution”).

The stock promotions of the investment banks drove up the prices of all stocks, not just the internet (or high technology) ones, supporting the historically unprecedented stock price rise of that decade. The “new era” thinking promulgated by these firms affected stock evaluations in general (Shiller, 2005), with the financial analysts of these banks noting the turn to a higher productivity, lower inflation economy (which apparently justified higher price/earnings ratios then were realized historically). Thus, while the rise in the prices of internet stocks increased investment in the new technology, the innovation financed with this venture capital raised the prices of all stocks, increasing the speculation in them and driving the stock market to record heights.

While the investment boom of the 1990s had both the financial innovations and stock price rises of a Minskyan boom, there remain important differences between them. Whereas the Minskyan boom is generalized, involving a rise in investment throughout the economy, the boom of the 1990s was concentrated in the high technology sectors, in computer equipment and software. Investment in these sectors increased at a much higher rate than in the others, and this investment boom, unlike Minsky’s, was expectation led - propelled by the profit promise of the new technology rather than the realized profit of past investments (indeed, much of the investment was

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16 The average annual growth rate of investment in non-residential information processing equipment and software was 18.3625% (1992-99), while the rate of investment in computer and peripheral equipment was even higher (39.625%), with both being significantly greater than the average annual growth rate in non-residential private investment as a whole (9.425% for 1992-99). Calculations drawn from the NIPA (tables 5.3.1 and 5.5.1) of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
in products that had not yet earned a profit). It was an innovation prompted and driven investment boom, not one that gradually built up steam through the adaptation of expectations to the increases in profits.

The “bust” that ended the boom of the 1990s also differs from Minsky’s. For Minsky, it is the rise in interest rates or the lowering of “margins of safety” that creates the financial difficulties of firms (and banks). In the 1990s, it was the excessive investment in the markets related to the new technology that brought on the downturn. It was when these excesses became apparent – the excessive competition in internet services and products and excess capacity in their infrastructure (such as fiber optic cables) - that the financing “dried up” and the firms failed. Again, stock prices and investment moved together, this time in the downward direction.

4.3 The 2000’s: Financialization

An alternative to the Tobin/Minsky view on the relation between share prices and innovation emerged specifically in the mid-2000s, as economists increasingly recognized that higher share prices were associated not with more investment and expenditure on innovative effort (e.g. R&D spending) on the part of firms, but with an increase in demand for financial assets, including shares of the firm itself (share buybacks). There were two dimensions of this “financialization.” One was the growth in importance of the financial sector, measured in terms of the share of rentier income in national income or in terms of financial sector profits as a share of total corporate profits, which reached 40% in the early 2000s.
The second was the financialization of non-financial corporations, as traditionally non-financial firms became more like financial holding companies, with a spectrum of financial services and financial investments swamping production in terms of their contribution to company revenues. Figure 4 shows the share of financial assets in total asset holdings of non-financial corporations. We see that the ratio rose steadily through the 1980s and 1990s and reached a peak of 50% by the early 2000’s. The ratio drops off sharply during the 2008 crash and has since jumped back up to pre-crash levels.

Another dimension of the financialization of non-financial sector was the increased use of profits to pay dividends and purchase the company’s own stock. Figure 5 shows dividend payments and share buybacks by non-financial corporations beginning in 1985, showing a veritable explosion in the 2000’s. When we compare the trend in share buybacks in the 2000s to the investment and R&D spending patterns shown in Figures 2 and 3, it is clear that the major non-financial corporations in the 2000s saw rising stock prices as a signal to buy back shares rather than reinvest in plant, equipment or R&D. It would seem that the goal of capital gain through a rising share price took precedence in management decisions over that of increasing profits through investment in real assets.
Figure 4: Financial Assets as a % of Total Assets, 1952-2012*

* Sources: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; NBER. Includes Nonfinancial Corporate Business, seasonally adjusted annual rates.
Some economists, notably Stockhammer (2004) and Lazonick (2009), attribute the financialization of the non-financial sector to the “shareholder revolution” of the late 1970s and 1980s, which shifted power in corporate governance from managers to shareholders, bringing to the fore a concern for raising shareholder value. This resulted in a change in corporate strategy from the Chandlerian one of increasing enterprise profits through their retention and reinvestment, to the Jensenian one of increasing shareholder value through profit distributions and disinvestments (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000, Lazonick, 2009). The accompanying growth in executive stock options, undertaken to better align manager and shareholder interests, intensified this
financialization of the enterprise, creating greater incentives for managers to focus on short-term movements in share prices.

To be clear, the bull market of the 2000s was not without a rise in business spending and in innovation. But the upturn in spending was focused on housing construction, which is not the same as an increase in productive capacity as envisioned in “q” theory. As shown in Figure 6, from the middle of the 2000’s, stock prices continued to be correlated with the housing boom, but not with R&D. The innovation in this decade was largely concentrated in the financial sector, with the invention of new financial instruments (many tied to the housing market), new marketing techniques for financial products, and the innovative application of new information technology that reduced the costs, and increased the scope, of financial transactions.
With financial innovation driving an expansion of the financial sector and a heightened volume of speculative activity, there was a conflation of the important dichotomy that Keynes (1964[1936]) draws between enterprise (“the activity of forecasting the prospective yield of assets over their whole life “) and speculation (“the activity of forecasting the psychology of the market“).17 Thus the bull market in the 2000s has not to date been associated with the innovative effort that both the q theory of investment, and the historical precedents, would indicate. Indeed, the upturn in share

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17 The quotes are from Keynes (1964), p. xx. Bhaduri (2011, p. 10) draws a similar distinction, writing that “Financial investment entails change of ownership (in the secondary market), while real investment results in the creation of new production capacity.”
buybacks beginning in 2010 would indicate that the era of financialization has not ended with the financial collapse of 2008.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have tried to shift the focus of discussion on the 2008 financial crisis from the question of whether it constituted a Minsky moment, to that of its longer-term implications for firm innovation. We stepped back from the immediate facts of 2008 to consider the financial requirements of innovation and provide some historical perspective on the financial boom and bust of the 2000s. Innovation, we found, has special financing requirements, and the uncertainty of the timing and magnitude of its returns, along with the intangibility of its capital investments, makes innovation more aptly financed with equity rather than debt.

Internal equity is not available in the case of new firms, so that their innovation depends on the external equity provided by investors. While established enterprises can have sufficient profit for innovation, they can distribute profits rather than invest them, and invest them in financial as well as real assets. Their innovative efforts thus also depend on the operations of stock markets, and these, we argued, can either promote the innovation of firms, as they did in the 1920s and 1990s, or deter their innovation, providing alternative uses for their profits, as occurred in the 2000s, with the result dependent on the objectives of both investors and firms.

The financialization that began in the 1980s has changed the objectives of non-financial corporations, and this, we argued, is the reason why the stock market boom of the 2000s was not accompanied by the investment and innovation of previous booms.
The full effects of that financialization were felt in that decade, with finance financing finance rather than innovation or expansion, and insofar as this was the case, there is justifiable concern about the long-term nature of the economic stagnation we are experiencing today.
References


